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ABSTRACT 
Recent changes in Public Administration brought local government management to a 
new era. In recent years we witnessed a huge transformation in this reality. Early forms 
of organization, control and coordination of public goods have been replaced by other 
forms of organization such as contracting-out, private/public partnerships and public 
enterprises and agencies. Using a transactions cost framework, along with financial 
situation analysis, environmental complexity and political degree of stability we seek to 
find relevant factors that drive local government choices regarding the coordination 
mechanisms in the provision of public services.   
 
INTRODUCTION  
Currently, due to their level of proximity and periodic transfers of competences, local 
governments are responsible for much of the services consumed by citizens. Their 
competences are growing and nowadays include water supply, promotion of regional 
development, treatment of solid waste, emergency management, health, education, 
social services, among many others. To cope with all these challenges, local 
governments changed from a single multi-purpose organization to a complex network of 
relationships with other public bodies, private agents, and non-profit organizations. In 
fact, local governments in Portugal no longer assume in isolation, through control and 
coordination, the provision of all public services. In reality, local governments combine 
competences of different organizations to improve efficiency in public service delivery.  
 
The traditional internal production of public services is long gone.  Nowadays we can 
identify three different mechanisms of governance: hierarchy, market and networks. The 
path of the internal evolution begun with the simple hierarchic organization composed 
by municipal services, then it moved to municipalized services (a more autonomous and 
flexible configuration) followed by the ability of local government to create their own 
local enterprises (Tavares & Camões, 2007), that in many cases replaced former 
arrangements. By the end of the 1990s, local governments began contracting with 
external actors to provide public services. Their option was to contract-out public 
services making use of market price mechanisms and market competitiveness. In other 
cases, local governments preferred a more collective action approach, through the 
creation of inter-local government associations or a less competitive partnership with a 
non-profit actor (mostly on social services). In all, we identify seven organizational 
configuration alternatives to control and coordinate public services within the three 
mechanisms of governance: municipal services; municipalized services; municipal 
enterprises; municipal corporations; contracting private agents; partnerships with non-
profit actors; and local governments associations. Our main objective is to identify and 
analyze the decision making process that led local governments to choose one 
mechanism of governance over the others. 
 
As we share Stein´s (1993) belief that each mechanism of governance should fit the 
nature of the public service it intends to provide, our goal is to establish limits between 
the natures of each public service. We employ typologies by Lowi (1964), Peterson 
(1981), and Barney (1999) to argue that: 1) inspective, regulatory and distributive 
activities are the main core of the hierarchical government mechanism; 2) activities 
similar to the ones provided by private agents, that is, where it is possible to identify 
and individualize consumers  (Brown & Potoski, 2003a; 2005), are usually contracted-
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out using market competition as a mechanism of governance (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977); 
and 3) associative and less competitive solutions (network mechanism) are adopted 
when social services need to be provided or when a huge amount of initial investment is 
required (Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock, 2007; Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Osbourne & 
McLaughlin, 2004). 
 
Further, we seek to establish additional relations between the alternative government 
mechanisms and other independent variables than the very nature of each public service. 
In order to do so, we identify four independent variables concerning the complexity of 
service being delivered, external environment, financial situation and administrative and 
political stability. First, we use a transaction cost framework to determine the 
complexity of each service as an independent variable. Services with high levels of 
specificity and difficult to measure involve high levels of transactions costs, making 
them less likely to be externalized (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Nelson, 1997; 
Ferris & Graddy, 1997). Second, we define external environment complexity as another 
variable. We argue that high levels of external complexity require more flexible 
solutions (Burns & Stalker, 1961) and, in contrast, the mechanism of governance based 
on hierarchy are more appropriate to lower levels of complexity in service provision 
(Weber, 1947; Alexander, 1995; Blau & Meyer, 1971). Third, we argue that different 
degrees of financial capacity drive local governments to choose different mechanisms of 
governance (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006).  Finally, using Hood (1998), Frant (1996) 
and Clingermayer and Feiock (1997), we suggest that political instability can put 
pressure on politicians to improve efficiency levels through the use of external agents.   
 
In order to conduct this research, we employ quantitative research methods. Based on 
our theoretical framework, we design a series of hypotheses and subject them to 
empirical testing using variables and indicators collected for this specific purpose 
(Amaratunga, Bladry, Sarshar, & Nelson, 2002). In order to measure transaction costs, 
we follow the methodology used by Brown and Potoski (2004; 2005; 2003a), Levin and 
Tadelis (2007), Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha, and Dasse (2007) and Leroux (2007) 
inquiring local government officials, and asking them to classify both asset specificity 
and measurability of public services. As a measure of environmental complexity, we 
employ, a Social Development Index, demographic and economic growth indicators. 
Financial indicators are also provided by official statistics giving full information about 
financial independency of local governments over central administration and a measure 
of indebtedness. Finally, based on Feiock, Clingermayer, and Dasse (2003) we directly 
ask local government officials to classify both administrative and political stability. 
 
With this investigation we seek an explanation for the decisions of local governments to 
deliver public services using specific mechanisms of governance. 
 
MECHANISM OF GOVERNANCE 
Coordination is one of the most important principles of organization, in order to achieve 
appropriate articulation between different parts of the organization and to avoid any 
unwilled duplication or overlap (Van de Ven, Koenig, & Delbecq, 1976). Currently, due 
to various factors, which include increased autonomy and expertise of public services, 
liberalization of public monopolies, citizen needs and demands, and globalization and 
the new information society era, the special need of governments articulation and 
aggregation actions within the various elements that provide nowadays public service 
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has increased considerably. In other words, governments found themselves in need to 
establish communication, control and monitoring systems, that enable them to manage 
the cultural and organizational diversity of different agents that are responsible to 
provide public services. In other words, governments need to develop new techniques of 
coordination very much appropriate and inherent to the nature of the responsibilities 
that need to be managed. 
 
Many scholars have already addressed the issue of coordination mechanisms, and the 
various strategies and techniques followed in order to achieve compatibility of the 
action between different agents. Initially, they began to be known as coordination 
mechanisms. Brickman (1979) calls them formats of coordination. Grandori (1987) 
identified them as diagrams of coordination. More recently, they took the label as 
mechanisms of governance (Peters, 1998). However, in all situations, the essence of the 
concept is virtually the same, that is, a liaison between the centers of decision within an 
organization or within an integrated network (Alexander, 1995). So it is the general 
opinion in the literature that coordination can be achieved through three mechanisms of 
governance: Hierarchic Type Mechanisms - HTM); Market Type Mechanisms - MTM); 
Network Type Mechanisms – TMR (Thompson, Frances, Levacic, & Mitchell, 1991; 
Verhoest, Peters, Beuselinck, Meyers, & Bouckaert, 2004; Alexander, 1995; Bradach & 
Eccles, 1991). 
 
Hierarchic Mechanisms 
Hierarchic types are the most common form of coordination and control (Verhoest, 
Peters, Beuselinck, Meyers, & Bouckaert, 2004). It is also considered as the most 
natural and efficient way to manage large organizations in a stable environment (Weber, 
1947; Alexander, 1995; Beetham, 1991; Blau & Meyer, 1971; Verhoest, Peters, 
Beuselinck, Meyers, & Bouckaert, 2004; Eliot, 1991; Grandori, 1997; Araújo, 2003). In 
this type of coordination, political control exercised ability to command, making use of 
authority powers over management decisions concerning the allocation of resources for 
investments, expenses and maintenance of production facilities. The line of command 
flows normally from the top to the bottom, through formal and clear lines of 
communication. Planning and regulation are the main tools to manage. As such, control 
is exercised in advance in order to verify the conformity of action with the scenario 
planned and pre-established. Thus, given the impossibility to constantly control each 
action of all organization members, hierarchic mechanisms chose the formalization of 
procedures in order to fight back randomness. 
 
So, it is a management model based on the sacrifice of personal interests in prop of 
organizational objectives strict enforcement of regulations, rules and orders (Hood, 
1998). Through its mechanisms, the hierarchical model seeks to solve problems 
considered too complex for individual agents. On the one hand, it simplifies and reduces 
the degree of complexity due to the rational division of labor, and on the other hand, it 
creates a rigid system of accountability to avoid risks of disorientation (inherent in the 
division of labour) and ensure that all efforts of the organization are consistent with the 
overall objective (Eliot, 1991). It is also focused to ensure stability (that is, a uniform 
pattern of behaviour in the way that problems are solved, regardless of the 
administrative agent in charge), strict follow outlined administrative procedure, and 
discipline for any agents involved (Beetham, 1991; Grandori, 1997). 
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This model is very focused in the search for organizational effectiveness. The Weberian 
understanding of this concept is much more organizational than economic, since it does 
not establish a direct relationship between resources consumed and objectives achieved 
(Beetham, 1991). Thus, in organizational terms, efficiency is reached with the reduction 
problem complexity, through its division into smaller and easier tasks. Tasks become 
more repetitive and regular which allows an increase in productivity (Grandori, 1997). 
Combined with this fragmentation of complex problems, we find a well-structured 
formal authority to prevent the risk of organization incoherence with their main 
objectives. In sum, organizational efficiency refers to its ability to reduce task 
complexity while simultaneously establishing a proper link between the various 
departments as well as seeking to achieve a uniform and standard rational behaviour for 
all staff (Weber, 1947; Blau & Meyer, 1971; Beetham, 1991).  
 
As we have already mentioned, authority is the coordination strategy used in this model 
of governance. Authority lays in rules and organizational norms of behaviour. It 
provides each element with clear information of what it is expected of him at each 
moment. It also facilitates the establishment of accurate behaviour and adequate 
procedures while distributing abilities, power and responsibility. In this way, the 
authority allows the correct supervision of all activities undertaken, it approves or 
rejects solutions, it solves conflicts between employees or departments, it punishes and 
forbids unwilled behaviours, it commands the unit, and renders possible performance 
evaluation (Hood, 1998; Eliot, 1991).  
 
 
Market Mechanisms 
The market mechanism is considered the traditional alternative to hierarchy. Its main 
thrust is that market forces – competitiveness – are able to coordinate the productive 
factors in a more efficient way than authority (Hood, 1994; Kettl, 2000; Ferris & 
Graddy, 1997; Stein, 1993; Gray & Jenkins, 1995; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Araújo, 
2000). That is, competition and exchanges between agents through the price mechanism 
allows a better form of communication and control than the one produced by authority. 
Market is presented as a natural form to coordinate activities based on two basic 
principles: first, information on prices and conditions of commercialization are 
available, in an equal form, to all agents; second, all the agents have an individualist 
strategy trying to maximize their utility. Market mechanisms act within an environment 
of complete information and full capacity of the individuals to process this information 
(Grandori, 1997).  
 
In the context of the Public Administration, market mechanisms were introduced during 
the process of modernization and administrative reform known as New Public 
Management (Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Kettl, 2000; Lane, 2000; Ferlie, 
Ashburner, Fitzgerald, Pettigrew, & Andrew, 1996; Pollitt, 1990; Araújo, 2000). 
According to Hood (1998), this model of management, based in market mechanisms, 
launches four main challenges in Public Administration management. In first place, the 
possibility of market mechanisms within Public Administration: the fragmentation of 
the administrative structures and the end of public monopolies allows the conception of 
alternative and innovative institutional arrangements for the production of public 
services, way beyond the simple extension of big government (Rehfuss, 1991); 
Secondly, citizen  choices: the introduction of market mechanisms aims to introduce 
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competition in the production of public goods and services as a form to maximize their 
utility as well as to increase efficiency in public administration (White, 1989). Thirdly, 
the behaviour of elected officials and bureaucratic performance are heavily criticized for 
having an individualistic attitude looking to maximize political power and agency 
budget (Niskanen, 1971; Buchanan, 1969). The use of external agents has as 
consequence the awareness that the bureaucratic organization is not a single solution for 
the production of goods and services. Acting in a competitive environment, bureaucratic 
deficiencies tend to be corrected, putting citizens back at the center of attention of 
Public Administration. Finally, the proliferation of alternative solutions to in-house 
production through the externalization of the production of goods and services modifies 
the role of the State. Government structures tend to concentrate on market regulation 
tasks while the Welfare State is becoming more and more a Hollow State, allowing 
other agents to provide public services (Brown & Potoski, 2004). 
 
As already mentioned, the basic principle of market mechanisms is competition 
between the agents whom intend to assume the contractual position of producers of 
public goods and services. Competition is based on a dispute between economic agents 
to identify the ones that can present the most efficient solutions for the service delivery. 
We also expect solutions with larger management flexibility in order to provide better 
public services (Ferris & Graddy, 1986).  
 
After externalizing the production, the initial investment, the property rights of capital 
assets, and the social responsibilities related to staff falls to the contracted agent. In such 
a way, governments gain flexibility and also the ability to decide the type and time 
period of the contract, the quality and the amount of public goods and services to be 
provided to citizens, and the possibility to adapt provision to their citizen needs. Thus, 
this situation of competition results to government as a maximizing way to stress private 
agents and third sector entities to present the most advantageous solutions, expecting to 
be chosen as the agent in charge of providing public services.  
 
Network Mechanism 
Traditionally, the literature in public management referred only to two alternative forms 
of governance: hierarchies and markets. However, other areas of knowledge already had 
developed efforts to identify a third way for the production and coordination of public 
goods and services (Tenbensel, 2005). More recently, it was suggested a hybrid 
solution, based on dependence and mutual trust among economic/administrative agents. 
The sharing of overall objectives, values and information, allows the creation of a 
network including several players, with different legal forms, each with its specific and 
individual targets. However, due to their coexistence, somewhat informal structures are 
created, allowing the various players in action to combine efforts and resolve conflicts. 
In this case, there is no formal authority and the hierarchy; each agent belongs to the 
network because it understands the need and advantages of integration, as this is a 
voluntary scheme. Also, pure competition, a characteristic of market mechanisms, is 
replaced here by trust and negotiation. 
 
The introduction of this discussion about the third alternative of governance in public 
management is associated with the work of Kickert (1997), Kooiman and Van Vliet 
(1993), Rhodes (1997; 2000), Klijn e Koppenjan (2000), among others. Thus, the 
concept of governance through the creation of networks can be understood as an 
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alternative to traditional methods of governance by authority and competition, using a 
collaborative approach of sharing information and resources and joint and concerted 
action (Considine & Lewis, 2003; Mossberg, 2007; Rhodes, 1997). 
 
The networks mechanism presents itself as an advantageous alternative in comparison 
with prior mechanisms. This is still a form of outsourcing, but it is intended to have a 
larger time horizon, one that lasts way beyond a simple transaction. It is based on the 
principle that, by solidifying trust and loyalty between independent social actors, it is 
possible to construct a viable alternative to the production of goods and services. This is 
due to joint action, since each actor identifies what it can win through cooperation 
(Considine & Lewis, 2003). Thus, it ensures the continuity and co-existence of the 
agents involved, while it respects the independence of each one, allowing the levels of 
efficiency typical in market mechanisms but with higher levels of trust and more 
flexibility not obtained in hierarchies. So, rather than assuming a competitive attitude 
networks assume a more collaborative action exploiting synergies and sharing resources 
and risks (Kickert, 1997; Araújo, 2003). Currently, organizations are increasingly 
celebrating this kind of agreements establishing several strategic alliances (Milward & 
Provan, 1998).    
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Stein (1993) found evidence that the mechanisms of governance are related and 
appropriate to the nature of the services to be provided. The question is how to make 
that choice? What criteria can be used to help solve this problem? 
 
The theory of transaction costs has been frequently applied to public services provision 
and provides a conceptual framework for analysis that highlights the strengths and 
limitations of each governance mechanism compared to the others (Tavares & Camões, 
2007; Ferris & Graddy, 1991; 1986; Nelson, 1997; Hindmoor, 1998; Brown & Potoski, 
2005). This theory argues that there are costs with the location of the agent that meets 
the pre-defined requirements (performance and quality), with the negotiation of the 
terms of the contract, and with the monitoring system required (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975). Therefore, transaction costs are essentially costs inherent to the 
production management of goods and services (Williamson, 1996; 1981). Thus, the 
selection of the mechanism of governance is done by analyzing which one best achieves 
the minimization of transaction costs (Brown & Potoski, 2003a; Nelson, 1997; Ferris & 
Graddy, 1997; Dollery, 2001; Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha, & Dasse, 2007).  
 
Assuming that market solutions have lower production costs, they will be the best 
option, as long as the increase in transaction costs does not exceed the savings on 
production costs (Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha, & Dasse, 2007; Powell, 1991). 
 
There are two factors that present themselves as the main causes of transaction costs: 
problems related with limited rationality and the opportunism of agents involved in the 
transaction process (Brown & Potoski, 2003a; Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981; 
McGuiness, 1991). The problem of limited rationality, analyzed by Simon (1960), 
explores the cognitive limits of individuals in the decision-making process. Thus, the 
element that establishes the contract does not possess the capacity or sufficient 
information to predict all hypothetical situations that may occur in the future, putting 
him in a complex situation when the moment comes to choose between governance 
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mechanisms. Thus, due to this information asymmetry, there is a risk that the agent 
takes an opportunistic behaviour, that is, seeks to maximize its utility at the expense of 
the public budget, and thus receive benefits above those achieved in a situation of total 
and equal information (Araújo, 2000). So, given the desire to improve the performance 
and efficiency of public services, governments seek the solution of outsourcing with the 
inconvenience of the loss of direct control over the action of the employment contract. 
Given the constraints of the information asymmetry and agent opportunism, government 
seeks to create ways to control and monitor the action of the agent. However, making 
the terms of the contract more complex will increase transaction costs, endangering any 
possibility of outsourcing.  
 
Also, the transaction costs largely depend on the nature of the activities to be transferred 
to an external agent. They are usually identified by the literature three risk factors that 
influence the behaviour of transaction costs: the specificity of the asset; the level of 
uncertainty, and the frequency of the transaction (Stein, 1993; Williamson, 1996; 
McGuiness, 1991; Nelson, 1997; Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock, 2007; Levin & Tadelis, 
2007; Brown & Potoski, 2003a).  
- Outsourcing activities with a high degree of specificity tends to favour the first 
agent with whom the contractual relationship is established, creating at the same 
time, a serious obstacle to the existence of market competition and a relationship 
of dependency by the contractor, achieved through long-term contracts (Brown 
& Potoski, 2003a). So, government will tend to avoid the externalization of the 
provision of asset with high level of specificity. However, third sector agents, 
due to their low opportunistic motivation compared with the potential ones 
shown by private agents, emerge as viable alternatives to outsourcing. (Lamothe, 
Lamothe, & Feiock, 2007). 
- Uncertainty varies within two factors: the tangibility and capacity for measuring 
activities to be contracted; and the degree of competitiveness presented in the 
market (Brown & Potoski, 2005; McGuiness, 1991). So, as provision of public 
services becomes more complex and difficult to describe, more complicated will 
be the government task of controlling and monitoring the contract. This 
uncertainty translates itself into an increase in transaction making harder the idea 
of externalization. 
- Finally, when provision of public services is needed at all time, it tends to create 
a degree of dependence between the agent and the principal. As already 
mentioned, in a similar situation, the opportunism of the agent makes the 
solution of externalization a tough decision. 
 
Hence, transaction costs theory argues that there are costs in using market type resulting 
from the limited rationality of the principal and from the risks inherent to the 
opportunism revealed by the agent. So, as transaction costs increase, benefits from 
market solutions reduce. The complexity of the service, the competitiveness of the 
market, the frequency of the transaction are some of the variables that influence the 
increase of transaction costs and hence the decision to externalize provision of public 
services (table 1).  
 
Table 1 – Alternative government Mechanism Vs nature of public services to be provided  
 Hierarchy Market 
Service Complexity  - High Indicial  Investment - Easy service delivery 
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- High Difficulty to measure 
service delivery; 
- High difficulties in re-
affecting assets; 
monitorization; 
- Low asset specificity ; 
External Environment 
Complexity  
- Low Market Competition 
- Service nature tend to create 
monopoly situation; 
- High Market Competition 
- Private agent with good 
reputation in the market; 
Transaction Implication  
- High dependency between 
agents; 
- Agents in charge of the 
production are easily 
substituted; 
Coordination Mechanism 
more suitable  
- Authority - Market competitiveness 
 
Alternatively to this economic perspective, we can also perform a more political 
analysis. The political constraints issues may also, in its extent, influence the transaction 
costs, making the risk and /or the uncertainty associated with the externalization so high 
that it will become an unattractive solution (Feiock, Clingermayer, & Dasse, 2003). 
That is, in a political context with high levels of turnover, policy makers are hardly able 
to make credible commitments. Due to this uncertainty in leadership, government 
becomes a less desirable partner in the eyes of the agent. They will keep accepting a 
public partnership although they will try to get a risk reward, which in itself negates the 
efficiencies arising from the same contract (Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha, & Dasse, 
2007).  
 
But we can also analyze this dimension underneath a different perspective. The political 
agents act with a specific kind of political rationality, one that drives them to a re-
election goal (Hood, 1998; Frant, 1996). In an adverse political context, where it is 
necessary to ensure re-election or extend a majority, the possibility of market solutions 
have some advantages: they represent an effort in trying to provide alternative of choice 
to citizens; they represent more efficient financial solutions (saving public resources); 
Organically they represent more flexible solutions. Thus, political agents may lead to an 
externalization of a certain service because they understand that this act could have 
positive political revenue, regardless of the factors previously discussed (Clingermayer 
& Feiock, 1997). 
 
We can also discuss the choice inherent to governance mechanism within a more 
normative perspective. In this way we can look up to the different and alternative roles 
lay by the State  where there are two structural and ideological approaches conflicting:  
one socialist or of left-wing matrix and another more liberal/right wing-matrix (Brunner 
& Meckling, 1977).  
 
The socialist doctrine has a judgment of the capitalist system. It condemns an economy 
organized by the market and private property. It considers that, in purely economic and 
commercial societies, Men are used as tools of economic interests ignoring the social 
values, on behalf of maximization profits. In this environment, there is so much 
pressure on individuals that they feel obliged to be competitive and to use all necessary 
means in search of capital accumulation, even if that means the exploiting of a similar. 
Thus, on many occasions, self interest is the source of conflicts, injustices and 
inequalities. This will require a change in the social order so as to relieve men from 
their task of profit maximization. The state should therefore assume and guarantee 
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access for all the community to sufficient range of goods and services that meet the 
collective needs. Such an action promotes the values of fairness and promotes equality 
between individuals. 
 
On the other side, a liberal view has a different assumption regarding the ideal role 
assumed by the state. It is based on the idea that market and competition are the best 
ways to use all available resources. Individuals have the capacity to be effective, but 
only if they are encouraged to do so. In rational attitude, men will prefer the maximum 
reward with the minimum of effort. A ubiquitous state in charge and responsible for 
making available a lot of public services will encourage the creation of an inefficient 
bureaucratic elite. The state should then limit itself to create the ideal conditions to 
ensure private initiatives and market perfect performance.  
 
Similarly, you can make a distinction between regulatory and non-regulatory activities 
(Lowi, 1964).Thus, regulatory activities, usually involving an action limiting the 
freedom of individuals, modeling their behaviour, have a coercive nature imposing costs 
and obligations on citizens. These activities represent the sovereignty essence of the 
state, in this way they will very hardly externalize unlike non-regulatory activities. 
 
PORTUGUESE SCENARIO 
 
The evolution of the politics of transference of attributions and abilities from the Central 
Government, as well as the necessity to increase the efficiency levels, has lead the Local 
Government to improve existing in house solution as well as consider and use new 
organizational agreements (Table 2). 
Table 2 - Different Organizational Agreement Choice 
 Organizational Agreement 
In House a. Municipal Services 
b. Municipalized Services 
Municipal Corporation Sector 
c. Municipal and Inter-
municipal Enterprises; 
d. Commercial Societies; 
Private Agents e. Contracting-out; 
f. Franchise; 
Networks 
g. Partnerships; 
h. Local Government 
Associations; 
i. Metropolitan Associations; 
 
In order to better suit our investigation purpose, we will re-organize this organizational 
agreements using three dimensions to classify them into Hierarchic Type Mechanism – 
HTM, Market Type Mechanism – MTM, or Network Type Mechanism – TMR:  
1. Degree of direct control – indicates the control exercised by the municipal 
executive. It is more direct when the executive makes use of its hierarchic 
powers to command and control production;  
2. Degree of competition – indicates the competitive environment in which an 
agent is involved in the provision of public services; 
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3. Degree of inter-organizational cooperation – indicates the degree of share 
resources, information and risks so as to make a cohesive action for the 
provision of public services. 
 
Thus, we saw that both in municipal and in municipalized services there is a strong 
presence of hierarchical control of local executive bodies away from any competition 
and cooperation with any other organization. In these cases it’s even the mayor the 
direct responsible for an efficient satisfaction of the citizens’ needs. Since 1998, some 
specific laws have allowed the creation of Municipal Enterprises (Empresas 
Municipais), responsible for the provision of local services. Municipal Enterprises are 
agencies with juridical personality and administrative, financial and patrimonial 
autonomy. They are regulated by the law of public Enterprises and by the commercial 
society’s code. Municipal Enterprises were created with a similar approach to those of 
the private sector, but with the mission of developing activities under the monitoring of 
the Local Government. Municipal enterprises have a higher degree of autonomy than 
municipal and municipalized services. However local government superintendence 
power allows them a control very similar to the one obtained with hierarchic power. In 
inter-municipal enterprises we have the same scenario with the only difference that this 
control is shared with other Local Governments. In commercial societies the level of 
control and competition depends very much from the agents making part of the same 
society. So, commercial societies with the majority of private agents have more 
competition and less direct control from local governments than the one where the last 
ones are in majority.  In another level, the relationship between Local Government and 
private agents (contracting-out or franchising) are characterized by the absence of an 
organic relationship/hierarchy between the principal and the agent. The nature of the 
relationship is based on the contract which is based on duties and obligations of the 
respective parties. The typical power of direction (issue orders to revoke decisions and 
punish) has been emptied and has limited the terms of the contract. At last, in a network 
situation, we see that in partnerships there is a high coordination of interests and a high 
spirit of mutual help among local government and third sector agents. In metropolitan 
associations, municipal control is less significant than the one identified in municipal 
associations. In this solution we verify a high level of cooperation mostly due to the 
associative nature of the organizational agreement. 
 
Table 3 – Local Government alternatives characterization 
 Degree of 
direct 
control 
Degree of 
competition 
Degree of inter-
organizational 
cooperation 
Governance 
Mechanism 
Municipal 
Services 
High None None HTM 
Municipalized 
Services 
High None 
Moderated depending 
on the number of 
participants 
HTM 
Municipal 
Enterprises 
High but 
indirect None 
Moderated depending 
on the number of 
participants 
HTM 
Inter-municipal 
Enterprises 
High – 
indirect and 
shared 
None 
Moderated depending 
on the number of 
participants 
NTM 
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Municipal 
Commercial 
Societies 
Moderated None 
Moderated depending 
on the number of 
participants 
NTM 
Public 
Commercial 
Societies 
Moderated None 
Moderated depending 
on the number of 
participants 
NTM 
Mixed 
Commercial 
Societies 
Very Low High 
Moderated depending 
on the number of 
participants 
NTM 
Contracting-out Very Low High Low MTM 
Franchise Very Low High Low MTM 
Partnerships Low Medium High NTM 
Local 
Government 
Associations 
Significant 
 
Low High NTM 
Metropolitan 
Associations 
Moderated Low High NTM 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Firstly, it was necessary to aggregate all undertaken services provided by local 
governments. Based on investigations of Nelson (1997), Ferris and Graddy (1991; 
1986), Feiock, Clingermayer and Dasse (2003) and Brown and Potoski (2003a; 2005), 
combined with the Portuguese reality we were able to gather a representative list of 46 
activities performed by local governments. Then, making use of Stein’s (1993) 
conclusion we will test the existing relations between the nature of services to be 
provided and the governance mechanism associated to their provision. 
 
Hierarchic type mechanism is associated with regulatory and supervisory activities, 
because they have a coercive character for the citizen (Lowi, 1964). The same 
governance mechanisms are also more suitable for distributive and developing 
activities, according to the classification of Peterson (1981), as well as activities closely 
linked to traditional functions of the state (Barney, 1999) (table 4). 
 
Table 4 – Hierarchy mechanism to municipal services provision 
Governance Mechanism Municipal Tasks 
Hierarchy 
1. Supervision of Economic Activities;  
2. Urban Management and Planning;  
3. Management of Urban Mobility;  
4. Municipal Police;  
5. Veterinary Services  
6. Office for Tourism Promotion ;  
7. Urban Management and Rehabilitation;  
8. External Cooperation;  
9. Fire Service and Civil Protection;  
10. Maintenance and Administration of Cemeteries;  
11. Maintenance and Administration Kennel;  
12. Maintenance and Administration of swimming pools;  
13. Maintenance and Management of stadiums;  
14. Maintenance and Administration of other sportive facilities;  
15. Department of Health and Hygiene; 
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The market mechanisms are more feasible to be applied in situations where good 
characteristics are similar to private goods (possibility of exclusion and rival 
consumption) (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977), or where the market reveals itself as a current 
and reliable alternative to the public sector (Brown & Potoski, 2003a , 2005). Thus, in 
situations where there is the opportunity and facility to establish unit costs, identify 
consumers, and where the activities have similarities with others supplied by the private 
market, we expect a prevalence of solutions for governance of the market (McGuiness, 
1991). 
Table 5 –Market mechanism to municipal services provision 
Governance Mechanism Municipal Tasks 
Market 
1. Safety of Buildings;  
2. Maintenance of Buildings;  
3. Roads construction and repair;  
4. Collective Transportation Service;  
5. Garbage Collection;  
6. Maintenance of Public Parks and Gardens  
7. Maintenance and Administration of parking;  
9. Maintenance and Administration Canteens  
10. School Transport Services; 
 
After Peterson (1981) networks, solutions are the most appropriate way of dealing with 
redistributive activities. In many cases these activities are related to the nature of social 
action (Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock, 2007; Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Osbourne & 
McLaughlin, 2004). It also shows how this mechanism of governance is the most 
appropriate in situations where it is necessary to make large investments, taking 
advantage of economies of scale (Julnes & Pindur, 2004; Morgan & Hirilinger, 1991). 
Table 6 –Network mechanism to municipal services provision 
Governance Mechanism Municipal Tasks 
Network 
1. Health Care and Medical Assistance;  
2. Elderly Service; 
3. Service to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion;  
4. Social Housing Service;  
5. Maintenance and Management of Childhood Gardens;  
6. Maintenance of elementary Schools;  
7. Support Services to the insertion of young people into working life  
8. Maintenance and Administration of Museums,  
9. Maintenance and Management of Libraries;  
10. Maintenance and Administration of Theatres;  
11. Maintenance and Management of Civil Aviation Infrastructure;  
12. Maintenance and Administration of markets Infrastructures;  
13. Maintenance and Management of Industrial Parks;  
11. Treatment of Solid Waste;  
12. Water Supply;  
13. Treatment sewage; 
14. Distribution of Electric Power; 
 
It´s also our objective to establish a link between the mechanisms of governance 
(hierarchy, market and networks), which constitute our dependent variables, and a set of 
independent variables that, in our opinion, cover the main challenges facing the 
vicissitudes and municipal management. Thus, in Table 7 there are described the 
different variables and the indicators used for its mediation. 
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Table 7 – Dependent Vs. Independent Variable 
 
Service complexity - This variable is based on the theory of transaction costs and aims 
to measure the complexity inherent in each municipal service. Transaction cost theory 
argues that complex services should be provided by the hierarchic system and that the 
simplest could be externalized (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; 1996; Nelson, 1997; 
Ferris & Graddy, 1997). However, in certain situations there are cases of outsourcing of 
services even in case of high complex degree. However, in these situations after 
Lamothe, and Feiock Lamothe (2007) investigation, it’s more likely in these last cases 
that we witness the establishment of partnership with third sector agents. The 
measurement of transaction costs will be made through the use of the concepts of 
specific assets and ability to measure, as the procedure used by Brown and Potoski 
(2004; 2005; 2003a) by Levin and Tadelis (2007), by Feiock , Clingermayer, Shrestha, 
and Dasse (2007)) and Leroux (2007). That is, for each activity described there will be 
asked to allocate a rating (from 1 to 5) for each of the above-mentioned concepts. 
 
Complexity of the external environment –It is assumed that as the external environment 
becomes more complex, the greater are the numbers of requests presented by citizens. 
In other words, as the degree of development grows, also the demands of the citizens 
become less basic and general, giving way to more specific and individualized ones. 
Thus, against an increase of complexity of external reality, hierarchic mechanism 
appears to be inadequate (Weber, 1947; Alexander, 1995; Beetham, 1991; Blau & 
Meyer, 1971). In more dynamic environment, this is with greater complexity, we expect 
to have more flexible solutions (Burns & Stalker, 1961), such as market mechanisms, 
and/or networks. Unlike the previous variable, to measure this concept of complexity, it 
will be used secondary data released by the national statistics. 
 
Financial Situation - in this case, what we want to see is the direct link between a 
difficult financial situation of local governments and the option of outsourcing solutions 
for the supply of goods and services. That is, having reduced financial capacity willing 
to improve efficiency in the provision of public services at reduced costs, Local 
Governments tend to use market or networks mechanisms in the provision of goods and 
services (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). On other occasions, the need for higher 
investment could constrain Local Governments to act in partnership with each other 
(Julnes & Pindur, 2004; Morgan & Hirilinger, 1991). Again the data to measure the 
concepts are drawn from the collection of the Portuguese financial municipalities’ 
yearbook prepared by Carvalho, Fernandes, Jorge and Camões, (2005). 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent  Variable 
Governance 
Mechanism: 
1.Hierarchy 
2. Market 
3. Network 
Service 
Complexity 
External Environment 
Complexity 
Financial 
Situation 
Political and 
Administrative 
Stability 
a) Asset 
Specificity; 
b) Measurability 
Capacity  
a) Social Development 
Degree; 
b) Economic Growth 
c) Demographic Growth; 
d) Population Density; 
 
a) Financial 
Independence 
Degree; 
b) Indebtedness 
degree; 
 
a) Political 
Stability degree; 
b) Administrative 
Stability degree; 
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Stability Policy and Administrative - As already mentioned the administrative and 
political stability of a local government may reduce transaction costs. That is, the 
maintenance for several years of the same executive may lead to a greater confidence 
and expectation of contract compliance. This stability facilitates contractual relations 
and we can expect, according to Feiock, Clingermayer, & Dasse (2003), a greater desire 
for outsourcing the provision of goods and services. However, according to the same 
authors, this relationship could have an inverse reading (as already mentioned). Thus, a 
high level of political instability may enhance greater outsourcing in the expectation that 
the use of market or network solutions will increase quality efficiency and effectiveness 
(Hood, 1998; Frant, 1996; Clingermayer & Feiock, 1997). For the measurement of this 
variable it will be used the procedure used by Feiock, Clingermayer, & Dasse 
(2003).That is, for every situation (administrative and political) it will be asked to 
allocate a rating (from 1 to 5) for each of the above-mentioned concepts. 
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